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WHY TWO FACETS OF CHAPTER 15 RULINGS HINDER
CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY PETITIONS IN THE
UNITED STATES
ABSTRACT
Chapter 15 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, in its first decade,
provided considerable relief for foreign debtors and their representatives in
the American judicial system. Eventually, though, various United States courts
disagreed upon two matters that impacted whether foreign debtors were able
acquire relief from the Bankruptcy Code. First, courts disagreed about
whether § 109(a), governing who could be a debtor in United States courts,
applied to chapter 15 petitions for recognition. Second, courts used two
separate dates to determine the debtor’s center of main interests, dealing with
the level of connectedness to a country. Some courts chose the date of the
petition for chapter 15 recognition; other courts looked further back and chose
the beginning date of the foreign proceeding. For various reasons, § 109(a)
was not supposed to apply to chapter 15 petitions, and the commencement date
of the foreign proceeding was the correct date to determine a debtor’s center
of main interests.
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INTRODUCTION
Since chapter 15 became part of the Bankruptcy Code, there has been an
increase in annual filings under it.1 One might ask: Why are foreigners
petitioning United States courts? For debtors and their foreign representatives,
obtaining chapter 15 recognition of a foreign proceeding delivers great relief in
the United States.2
There are several reasons to apply for chapter 15 recognition of a foreign
proceeding, including the automatic stay and trustee powers.3 In one case, a
foreign representative sought chapter 15 recognition because he wanted to
prevent a creditor “from dissipating assets of [an] E-Trade account until final
determination of the ownership thereof” had been determined in the foreign
proceeding.4
Chapter 15 allots automatic relief through 11 U.S.C. § 1520.5 Additionally,
§ 1521 grants a bankruptcy court discretion to provide supplementary relief
that may be necessary to protect a debtor or its creditors.6 Supplemental relief
covers a lengthy range from gathering evidence to examining witnesses, even
to giving a foreign representative administrative powers over a debtor’s assets.7
Once chapter 15 recognition has been granted to a foreign proceeding,

1 See Chapter 15 Filings (2005–Present), AM. BANKR. INST., http://abi-org.s3.amazonaws.com/
Newsroom/Bankruptcy_Statistics/Chapter15Filings-Thru2Q2014.pdf (last modified Jan. 26, 2015); see also
Van C. Durrer II, David M. Turetsky & Glenn S. Walter, Expanding Use of Chapter 15 Tests Its Protections
and Limits, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE MAG., Jan. 2013, at 1.
2 At times, this Comment uses “debtor” and “foreign representative” interchangeably. They may refer to
the same person, but not always. In the context of chapter 15 cases, there may be a debtor who has been
involved in a foreign proceeding. Out of that proceeding, a court appoints a foreign representative (sometimes
the debtor himself) to file for chapter 15 recognition of the foreign proceeding in the United States.
3 See In re Tien Chiang, 437 B.R. 397, 402 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) (“The recognition of a foreign
proceeding . . . brings certain statutory benefits to the debtor. Section 1520(a) specifies that, upon recognition:
(a) the automatic stay provisions of §§ 361 and 362 apply with respect to a debtor’s U.S. property within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States; (b) §§ 363, 549 and 552 apply to a transfer of interest of the debtor
in U.S. property; (c) the foreign representative may operate the debtor’s business in the United States and may
exercise the powers of a trustee pursuant to §§ 363 (use, sale or lease of property) and 552 (postpetition effect
of security interests); and (d) § 552 applies to U.S. property of the debtor.”). Legislative history indicates that
§ 542, not § 552, applies when chapter 15 recognition has been granted. See id. at 402 n.13 (citing H.R. REP.
NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 115 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 177).
4 Id. at 402–03.
5 See In re Rede Energia S.A., 515 B.R. 69, 89 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“If a foreign case is
recognized . . . , certain relief automatically goes into effect, pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1520.”).
6 See id. at 89 (“[U]nder section 1521, a bankruptcy court may grant ‘any appropriate relief’ in order to
‘effectuate the purpose of this chapter and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors.’”).
7 See id. at 89–90.
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§ 1507(a) permits a court to offer a foreign representative any additional
support available in the Code or in any other United States law.8
Two topics among chapter 15 decisions have garnered opposing views in
recent years. First, courts have speculated whether § 109(a), which governs
who may be a debtor under the Code, applies to chapter 15 petitions.9 Second,
courts have disagreed about when to determine a foreign party’s center of main
interests (“COMI”), which is a phrase dealing with a petitioner’s level of
connectedness to a foreign country.10 Some courts determine COMI on the
chapter 15 petition date in the United States.11 Other courts, however,
determine COMI by looking back to the petitioner’s status at the beginning of
the foreign proceeding (a “lookback period”).12
This Comment proposes the following thesis: Chapter 15 recognizes
bankruptcy’s intricacies in a globalized age. Courts in such an age should hold
that § 109(a) does not apply to chapter 15 and that COMI is determined
through a lookback period to the commencement of the foreign proceeding.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 15’s International Predecessors
During the twentieth century, European Community Member States were
treaty-bound “to enter into negotiations with each other” regarding court
recognition and enforcement of judgments from among the Member States.13
That duty inspired creation of the 1968 Brussels Convention on jurisdiction
and judgment enforcement, which excluded insolvency proceedings but further
developed cross-border cooperation among European courts.14 Between 1963

8 See id. at 90 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1507(a)–(b) (2012); In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 190 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31).
9 See 11 U.S.C. § 109; e.g., Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737
F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013); Transcript of Hearing, In re Bemarmara Consulting a.s., 13-13037-KG (Bankr. D.
Del. Dec. 17, 2013) (LexisNexis, Federal Bankruptcy Law) [hereinafter Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing].
10 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502(4), 1516(c).
11 See, e.g., Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 2010).
12 See, e.g., In re Millennium Glob. Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 72 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 474 B.R. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
13 Case C-1/04, Susanne Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. I-701, I-704, Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo
Colomer.
14 See id. at I-704–05.
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and 1980, a committee of European Community experts drafted two proposals
to regulate cross-border insolvency, but they never agreed on the proposals.15
International work toward the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency
(“Model Law”) accelerated with the European Union Convention on
Insolvency Proceedings (“Convention”).16 During the mid-1990s, a group of
national experts developed the Convention, which was simpler and less rigid
than its attempted predecessors.17 In November 1995, the Convention was
finalized and ready to go into force, but the United Kingdom did not sign it by
the required deadline.18 As a result, the Convention did not become law.19
Then, Germany and Finland reintroduced the failed Convention as the
European Union Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings
(“Regulation”).20 That initiative drew authority from the 1997 Treaty of
Amsterdam and converted the unsuccessful Convention into a regulation that
binds all European Union Member States (except Denmark).21 The
Convention’s content was unaltered; only the legal status of the document
changed.22
After decades of trying to create cross-border insolvency laws, Europe
succeeded with the Regulation. Subsequently, the United Nations provided
15

See id. at I-705.
See Lavie v. Ran, 406 B.R. 277, 281 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“[T]he drafters of the Model Law consulted
the Convention’s terminology.”), aff’d sub nom. In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017.
17 See Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. at I-705.
18 See Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813, I-3817, Opinion of AG Jacobs.
19 See Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. at I-705–06.
20 See Eurofood, 2006 E.C.R. at I-3818; see also Initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany and the
Republic of Finland with a View to the Adoption of a Council Regulation on Insolvency Proceedings,
Submitted to the Council on 26 May 1999, 1999 O.J. (C 221) 6, 8. See generally Council Regulation
1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 1 (EU).
21 See Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. at I-706 (“[T]he impulse for that transformation flourished in the
fertile ground of Articles 61(c) EC . . . and 67(1) EC, . . . which were ‘communitarised’ under the Treaty of
Amsterdam, thereby constituting one of the Treaty’s main achievements.”); Insolvency proceedings, EURLEX, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l33110 (last updated Sept. 2, 2014)
(“This law lays down common rules for cross-border insolvency proceedings in European Union (EU)
countries, except Denmark.”); see also Eurofood, 2006 E.C.R. at I-3818 (“The Regulation was adopted on the
basis of Articles 61(c) EC and 67(1) EC, on the initiative of Germany and Finland.”). See generally Treaty of
Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities
and Certain Related Acts, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1.
22 See Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. at I-706; Eurofood, 2006 E.C.R. at I-3817 (“The text of the
Regulation is . . . identical in all material respects to the text of the Convention.”). Even before the Regulation
was adopted, EU Member States had embraced a “process of mutual recognition and enforcement of
judgments in bankruptcy proceedings by means of bilateral treaties.” Staubitz-Schreiber, 2006 E.C.R. at I-705.
Those treaties are listed in Regulation Article 44(1) and are replaced by the Regulation. See id.
16
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cross-border insolvency laws to the global community by using many of the
Regulation’s concepts.23
The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(“UNCITRAL”) Model Law was introduced to the United Nations on
December 15, 1997, and the General Assembly accepted it on January 30,
1998.24 Since then, the United Nations has published and updated an enactment
guide, produced in 2014 most recently.25 While the Model Law and the
Convention—and the Regulation—are not identical completely, “the drafters
of the Model Law consulted the Convention’s terminology.”26 As of 2016,
forty-one nations have adopted the Model Law in forty-three jurisdictions.27
UNCITRAL’s Working Group V (Insolvency Law) has proposed a change to

23 See In re Tien Chiang, 437 B.R. 397, 401 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2010) (stating that the Regulation and the
Model Law have common concepts).
24 See G.A. Res. 52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998).
25 See G.A. Res. 68/107 (Dec. 18, 2013); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW
ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, U.N. Sales No. E.14.V.2
(2014).
26 Lavie v. Ran, 406 B.R. 277, 281 n.2 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (citing U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Guide
to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, 30th Sess., May 12–30, 1997, ¶ 75,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/442 (Dec. 19, 1997) (noting definition inspiration from the Convention)), aff’d sub nom.
Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 2010). Additionally,

the Convention is better understood by consulting the Virgos-Schmit Report. Although the
language of the Virgos-Schmit Report and Convention may not be identical to that in the
Bankruptcy Code, the corresponding sections of both the Virgos-Schmit Report and the
Convention [or Regulation] give insight into the origin of the terms used.
Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 172). Compare
Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, and Virgós-Schmit Report on the Convention on Insolvency
Proceedings, at 1, Council Document 6500/96 (May 3, 1996), with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, and 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1501–1532 (2012).
27 See Status UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency (1997), UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited May 2,
2016) (listing the nations alphabetically as Australia (2008), Benin (2015), Burkina Faso (2015), Cameroon
(2015), Canada (2005), Central African Republic (2015), Chad (2015), Chile (2013), Colombia (2006),
Comoros (2015), Congo (2015), Côte d’Ivoire (2015), Democratic Republic of the Congo (2015), Equatorial
Guinea (2015), Gabon (2015), Greece (2010), Guinea (2015), Guinea-Bissau (2015), Japan (2000), Kenya
(2015), Malawi (2015), Mali (2015), Mauritius (2009), Mexico (2000), Montenegro (2002), New Zealand
(2006), Niger (2015), Philippines (2010), Poland (2003), Republic of Korea (2006), Romania (2002), Senegal
(2015), Serbia (2004), Seychelles (2013), Slovenia (2007), South Africa (2000), Togo (2015), Uganda (2011),
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: British Virgin Islands (2003), Gibraltar (2014), and
Great Britain (2006), United States of America (2005), Vanuatu (2013)).
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the Model Law that will affect how courts determine COMI; this Comment
discusses that proposal later.28
B. Chapter 15’s History in the United States
In 2005, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act (“BAPCPA”), which added chapter 15 to the Code.29 Congress
adopted the Model Law as chapter 15 with very few changes.30
Simultaneously, BAPCPA repealed § 304,31 which was the former
bankruptcy section that dealt with foreign proceedings.32 In its entirety, § 304
conveyed a broad generality about cases ancillary to foreign proceedings and
contained slightly more than 250 words, whereas chapter 15 is intricate and has
over five thousand words.33 A corresponding Senate report to § 304 confirms a
preference for simplicity by stating that the guidelines were “designed to give
the court the maximum flexibility in handling ancillary cases.”34
C. Chapter 15’s Relevant Provisions in the Bankruptcy Code
Section 1501 declares that the purpose of chapter 15 “is to incorporate the
Model Law . . . to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with cases of
cross-border insolvency.”35 Among its objectives are fairness, efficiency, and
cooperation between United States courts and courts in other nations.36 To
accomplish those objectives, § 1501 applies to several specified categories,
28 See In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing U.N. Comm’n on
Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Rep. on its 41st Sess., Apr. 30–May 4, 2012, ¶ 60, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.9/742 (May 8, 2012) [hereinafter Rep. on Working Group V’s 41st Sess.] (stating that a proposed
change to the Model Law to clarify that the COMI determination be made as of the date of the commencement
of the foreign insolvency proceeding “received wide support”)).
29 See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 801,
119 Stat. 23, 134–45.
30 Compare id., with UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 25.
31 See In re Ran, 607 F.3d at 1020 (“[BAPCPA] replaced former Section 304 of the Bankruptcy
Code . . . .”).
32 See In re Millennium Glob. Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 69 n.6 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2011) (“Chapter 15 was adopted, effective October 17, 2005, replacing § 304 of the Bankruptcy Code, which
was repealed.”).
33 See 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000); 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532 (2012).
34 S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 35 (1978) (“Principles of international comity and respect for the judgments and
laws of other nations suggests that the court be permitted to make the appropriate orders under all of the
circumstances of each case, rather than being provided with inflexible rules.”).
35 11 U.S.C. § 1501.
36 See id.
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including when assistance is sought by a foreign court or a foreign
representative and when cases are pending concurrently in the United States
and abroad.37
Interestingly, § 1501 states that it does not apply to § 109(b) and (e), but
this Comment focuses heavily on whether nearby § 109(a) applies to chapter
15 cases.38 Section 109(a) states that a debtor must be “a person that resides or
has a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States, or a
municipality.”39
When a debtor seeks chapter 15 status, he turns to § 1515, which contains
the rules to applying for recognition of the foreign proceeding.40 In this
scenario, “[a] foreign representative applies to the court for recognition of a
foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has been appointed.”41
Various documents accompany the application, including one that identifies all
judicial proceedings in which the petitioner is involved outside of the United
States.42 If a court believes that § 1515’s requirements are met, then it will
grant recognition of the foreign proceeding under § 1517.43
Finally, § 1508 guides any court that interprets chapter 15.44 The section
directs that “the court shall consider [chapter 15’s] international origin, and the
need to promote an application of this chapter that is consistent with the
application of similar statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.”45
II. ANALYSIS
Multiple circuits disagree about two issues in current chapter 15 case law:
(1) the applicability of § 109(a) to chapter 15; and (2) the proper time to
37 See id. (“This chapter applies where – (1) assistance is sought in the United States by a foreign court or
a foreign representative in connection with a foreign proceeding; (2) assistance is sought in a foreign country
in connection with a case under this title; (3) a foreign proceeding and a case under this title with respect to the
same debtor are pending concurrently; or (4) creditors or other interested persons in a foreign country have an
interest in requesting the commencement of, or participating in, a case or proceeding under this title.”).
38 See id. The contents of § 109(b) and (e) are not relevant to this Comment.
39 11 U.S.C. § 109.
40 See 11 U.S.C. § 1515.
41 Id.
42 See id.
43 See 11 U.S.C. § 1517. Section 1517 states, however, that an order granting recognition is subject to
§ 1506, which lets courts refuse to act in a way manifestly contrary to United States public policies. 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1506, 1517.
44 See 11 U.S.C. § 1508.
45 Id.
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determine COMI in a cross-border insolvency case. This Comment discusses
two sides of each issue, respectively, and concludes that § 109(a) does not
apply to chapter 15 and that COMI is determined through a lookback period to
the commencement of the foreign proceeding.
A. Section 109(a) Requirements in the United States
Section 109(a) requires a person petitioning for bankruptcy to reside or
have a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States.46
Regardless of whether Congress considered how this section affects chapter
15, a question emerges: Does § 109(a) apply to cases filed under chapter 15 of
the Code? The following subsections discuss how courts have addressed that
question in recent years, concluding that § 109(a) does not apply to chapter 15
recognition petitions.
1. Section 109(a) Applies to Chapter 15
Even though chapter 15 became part of the Code in 2005, courts did not
address whether general provision § 109(a) applies to chapter 15 proceedings
until late 2013.47 In December 2013, the Second Circuit addressed § 109(a)’s
applicability in Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re
Barnet).48 The court declared that § 103(a) applies all of chapter 1 to the Code,
including to chapter 15.49 By simple extrapolation then, § 109, within chapter
1, must apply to chapter 15.50 Consequently, § 109(a) “creates a requirement
that must be met by any debtor,” regardless of the controlling chapter.51 Courts
are unable to grant chapter 15 recognition of a foreign proceeding until the
debtor satisfies § 109(a).52

46

See 11 U.S.C. § 109.
See Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir.
2013); see also In re Octaviar Admin. Pty Ltd., 511 B.R. 361, 367 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he Second
Circuit issued its decision, holding for the first time that a debtor that is the subject of a foreign proceeding
must meet the requirements of section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code before a bankruptcy court may grant
recognition of the foreign proceeding.”).
48 See 737 F.3d at 246.
49 See id. at 247 (“Section 103(a) of “Title 11 provides that, other than for an exception not relevant here,
Chapter 1 ‘of this title . . . appl[ies] in a case under chapter 15.’”).
50 See id. (“Section 109 . . . is within Chapter 1 of Title 11 and so, by the plain terms of the statute, it
applies ‘in a case under chapter 15.’”).
51 Id.
52 See id. (“The debtor . . . must meet the requirements of Section 109(a) before a bankruptcy court may
grant recognition of the foreign proceeding.”).
47
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The Second Circuit acknowledged that the Model Law “does not contain an
express requirement akin to Section 109(a).”53 The Model Law allows
adopting states, however, to modify, or even omit, sections that they do not
want in their national laws.54 UNCITRAL omitting any language similar to
§ 109(a) does not outweigh Congress’s plain language in chapter 1.55 Without
citing any evidence, the court speculated that Congress may have wanted to
limit chapter 15’s relief because of additional relief available in other
chapters.56 Therefore, the Second Circuit held that § 109(a) applies to chapter
15, and in the particular case, the matter was remanded to determine if the
debtor satisfied § 109(a).57
In the remanded case, In re Octaviar Administration Pty Ltd., the
bankruptcy court reiterated that the Code’s plain language led to an
understanding that § 109(a) sets certain eligibility requirements, even for
chapter 15 petitions.58 The Octaviar court pointed out that the Second Circuit’s
Barnet holding was the first time a court said that a debtor subject to a foreign
proceeding had to meet § 109(a)’s requirements.59 To align with Barnet, and
chapter 15 generally, the court stated that fostering international cooperation in
bankruptcy proceedings is possible once a debtor makes a showing of a
domicile, place of business, or property in the United States.60 Only then may
courts grant recognition under § 1517.61 The court examined numerous
arguments and held that the debtor had property in the United States to meet
§ 109(a)’s requirements.62
53 Id. at 251 (citing UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO
ENACTMENT AND INTERPRETATION, supra note 25).
54 See id. (“[T]he Model Law also states that ‘a State may modify or leave out some of its provisions.’”
(quoting UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE TO ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION, supra note 25, at Part 2 ¶ 12)).
55 See id. (“[T]he omission of Section 109(a), or its equivalent, from the Model Law does not suffice to
outweigh the express language Congress used in adopting Sections 109(a) and 103(a).”).
56 Id. (“Congress . . . may have intended to limit the relief provided by Chapter 15 because it knew that
additional relief was already available outside of Chapter 15.”).
57 See id.
58 See 511 B.R. 361, 364 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[U]nder a plain reading of the relevant statutory
provisions, a petition in a chapter 15 case is required to meet the eligibility requirements set forth in section
109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.”).
59 See id. at 367.
60 See id. at 369.
61 See id.
62 See id. at 375 (“The Court concludes that because Octaviar’s claims and causes of action against
Drawbridge constitute property located in the United States, the Foreign Representatives satisfy the eligibility
requirements of section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. . . . Drawbridge does not dispute that the funds in the
Client Trust Account constitute property in the United States pursuant to section 109(a) of the Bankruptcy
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Later in the same year, the In re Suntech Power Holdings Co. court applied
§ 109(a) to a chapter 15 petition.63 Evidence demonstrated that a Bank of New
York account existed before the chapter 15 proceeding.64 The court held that a
bank account is enough to satisfy § 109(a).65 Furthermore, the court declared
that § 109(a) rejects drawn-out investigations into how the bank account was
acquired and what amount of money it contains, thus lowering the restrictive
bar set by § 109(a) and allowing the easily-demonstrable existence of a bank
account to satisfy connection to the United States.66
In 2015, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York
expanded eligibility that satisfies § 109(a) in In re Berau Capital Resources
PTE Ltd.67 The court noted that scholars have criticized courts’ application of
§ 109(a) to chapter 15, but Barnet makes the application binding precedent in
the Second Circuit, causing the court to apply it.68 The court looked to contract
law and found that contracts create intangible property rights for a debtor.69
From there, the court was able to show that § 109(a) can be satisfied by an
attorney retainer agreement between a foreign representative and an attorney in
the United States or by a debtor holding an indenture for a large amount of
U.S. currency.70

Code. . . . Notably, Drawbridge concedes that prepetition retainers and transfers of property can serve as a
basis for section 109(a) compliance and do not, in and of themselves, constitute grounds for a finding of bad
faith.”).
63 See 520 B.R. 399, 411 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“This [§ 109(a)] requirement applies to foreign
debtors seeking relief under chapter 15.” (citing Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re
Barnet), 737 F.3d 238, 247 (2d Cir. 2013))).
64 See id. at 412.
65 Id. (citing In re Octaviar, 511 B.R. at 372–73; In re Yukos Oil Co., 321 B.R. 396, 407 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. 2005)).
66 See id. at 413 (citing In re Octaviar, 511 B.R. at 373).
67 See 540 B.R. 80 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015).
68 See id. at 81–82 (citing Daniel M. Glosband & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 Recognition in
the United States: Is a Debtor “Presence” Required?, 24 INT’L INSOLVENCY REV. 28 (2015)).
69 See id. at 83 (“Contracts create property rights for the parties to the contract. A debtor’s contract rights
are intangible property of the debtor. (citing Slater v. Town of Albion (In re Albion Disposal, Inc.), 217 B.R.
394, 407–08 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“[I]t is well-established . . . that a debtor’s contractual rights—including rights
arising under post-petition contracts—are included in the property of the estate.”); U.S. Bank N.A. v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 485 B.R. 279, 295 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d, 730 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2013); Wallach v.
Nowak (In re Sherlock Homes of W.N.Y., Inc.), 246 B.R. 19, 23–24 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that
listing contracts between the debtor/broker dealer and prospective sellers bestowed contractual rights upon the
parties and the contract rights were assets of the debtor))).
70 See id. at 82.
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2. Section 109(a) Does Not Apply to Chapter 15
Four cases apply § 109(a) to chapter 15, but two other cases argue against
applying it.71 All of these rulings have been handed down since late 2013,
creating a stage for a possible circuit split.72
A mere six days after the Second Circuit issued Barnet, the Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Delaware issued In re Bemarmara, which questions
§ 109(a)’s place in chapter 15 petitions.73 The court acknowledged that the
Second Circuit applied chapter 1 eligibility requirements to a debtor in a
foreign proceeding.74 The Bemarmara court interpreted Barnet as saying that a
debtor who does not have assets in the United States is disqualified from
applying for chapter 15 recognition.75 The bankruptcy court did not hesitate to
disagree with the Second Circuit because Barnet was not controlling
precedent.76 In fact, the court declared “that there is a strong likelihood that the
Third Circuit, likewise, would not agree with that [Barnet] decision.”77
The Bemarmara court explained its disagreement with the Second Circuit
by turning to the language of § 109(a) first, which “provides for Debtors under
this title.”78 The court illustrated that a debtor is not petitioning for recognition;
instead, a foreign representative seeks recognition of a foreign proceeding.79 A
foreign representative’s task is to aid the foreign proceeding.80 Accordingly,
§ 109(a) does not regulate foreign representatives.81 The lack of discussion in
chapter 15 about § 109(a) may be an error, and there may have been
Congressional intent to exclude the section from applying to chapter 15.82

71 Compare Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir.
2013), and In re Berau, 540 B.R. 80, and In re Suntech, 520 B.R. at 412, and In re Octaviar, 511 B.R. 361,
with In re Soundview Elite, Ltd., 503 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), and Transcript of Bemarmara
Hearing, supra note 9.
72 Compare In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238, with In re Octaviar, 511 B.R. 361, and In re Soundview Elite,
503 B.R. 571, and Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing, supra note 9.
73 See Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing, supra note 9, at 8 (stating that the case was from December 11,
2013).
74 See id.
75 See id. (“[T]he absence of assets in the United States disqualifies a Chapter 15 filing.”).
76 See id. (“[T]his Court does not agree with the decision of the Second Circuit.”).
77 Id. at 8–9.
78 Id. at 9 (emphasis added).
79 See id. (“[A] Foreign Representative . . . is petitioning the Court, not the Debtor in the foreign
proceeding.”).
80 See id. (“The Foreign Representative is asking for recognition in aid of that foreign proceeding.”).
81 See id. (“[T]he requirements of Section 109(a) do not control.”).
82 See id. (omitting evidence or a source for this claim against applying § 109(a) to chapter 15).
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The court turned to § 1502 for a second reason not to apply § 109(a).83 The
court emphasized that § 1502 “defines Debtor as an entity that is the subject of
a foreign proceeding.”84 Importantly, § 1502’s definition does not create any
asset-ownership requirement in the United States.85 The definition is
straightforward: “A Debtor is an entity that is involved in a foreign
proceeding” without any requirement of having assets in the United States.86
3. Why This Comment Suggests § 109(a) Does Not Apply to Chapter 15
When addressing the question of whether § 109(a) applies to chapter 15
cases, courts should hold that the section has no bearing on the recognition of
cross-border proceedings for at least three reasons.
First, the structure of chapter 15, especially §§ 1515 through 1524 about
recognition, contains everything that a court needs to handle a cross-border
bankruptcy case.87 Regarding statutory interpretation, scholars have noted that
statutory language is the most solid indication of what legislators
were trying to do. If the mental-state intentions of legislators are
important, they are most straightforwardly represented in the
statutory words. This does not mean we can move easily from the
words of a statute to the dominant intentions of most legislators.
Because few legislators review statutory language carefully, and most
may have little idea what it contains, the precise terms of any single
83 See id. (“I would also read to you from Section 1502 which is the definition section for Chapter
15 . . . .”).
84 Id.
85 See id. (“[T]here was nothing in that definition . . . [that] reflects upon a requirement that [the] Debtor
have assets.”).
86 Id. Note that the Soundview Elite decision may create a tangential problem for determining who may
be a debtor under the Code. See 503 B.R. 571 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014). The Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York issued Soundview Elite in January 2014, in between the Barnet and Octaviar decisions of
December 2013 and June 2014, respectively. See 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013); 511 B.R. 361, 372 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2014); 503 B.R. 571. The Octaviar court applied § 109(a) to a chapter 15 proceeding, but before
then, the Soundview Elite court stated explicitly that chapter 15 “[r]ecognition . . . is not governed by
domicile.” 503 B.R. at 595 n.67; see also 511 B.R. at 364 (stating that 11 U.S.C. § 109(a) applies to chapter
15). Instead, recognition of the foreign proceeding is determined by the debtor’s COMI. See In re Soundview
Elite, 503 B.R. at 595 n.67 (“[R]ecognition . . . turns on the COMI of the foreign debtor.” (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 1517(a)(1) (2012))); In re Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R.
122, 127–28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)). At least in the Southern District
of New York then, § 109(a)’s reference to domicile may not apply to chapter 15 cases, even though § 109
discusses eligibility, and § 1517 discusses recognition. Compare In re Soundview Elite, 503 B.R. at 595 n.67,
with 11 U.S.C §§ 109, 1517.
87 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501–1532; see also In re Soundview Elite, 503 B.R. at 595 n.67 (“Recognition
under U.S. law, [is] determined under Bankruptcy Code sections 1515 through 1524 . . . .”).
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provision may tell us rather little about what most legislators wanted;
but it often remains true that no other guides to intentions are more
reliable.88

Congress likely did not consider making significant changes to chapter 15
because it is a model international law, and “[a]ny departures from the actual
text of the Model Law . . . were as narrow and limited as possible.”89
Section 1509(a), which governs a right of direct access, states that a foreign
representative commences a case when he files a chapter 15 petition with a
court.90 If the court recognizes that foreign proceeding, then it grants comity to
the foreign representative and cooperates with him.91 Section 1517(a) states
that a court will grant recognition if certain criteria are met.92 The foreign
representative must be a person or body.93 Additionally, the petition must meet
§ 1515’s requirements.94 Section 1517 does not mention any of the criteria set
forth in § 109(a).95 Throughout chapter 15, however, Congress referred to
various sections of the Code.96
Applying the expressio unius est exclusio alterius interpretive canon of
construction, which states that mentioning one matter excludes another matter,

88

1999).

KENT GREENAWALT, LEGISLATION: STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 20 QUESTIONS 37 (Found. Press

89 Tacon v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 322 & n.15 (5th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 720 (2005) [hereinafter
Westbrook, Chapter]).
90 See 11 U.S.C. § 1509(a) (“A foreign representative may commence a case under section 1504 by filing
directly with the court a petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding under section 1515.”); see also id.
§ 1504 (“A case under this chapter is commenced by the filing of a petition for recognition of a foreign
proceeding under section 1515.”).
91 See id. § 1509(b)(3) (“If the court grants recognition under section 1517 . . . a court in the United
States shall grant comity or cooperation to the foreign representative.”).
92 See id. § 1517(a).
93 Id. § 1517(a)(2).
94 Id. § 1517(3).
95 See id. § 1517.
96 See, e.g., id. § 1501(c)(1) (referring to § 109(b)); id. § 1501(c)(2) (referring to § 109(e)); id. § 1505
(referring to § 541); id. § 1509(e) (referring to § 306); id. § 1511 (referring to §§ 301–303); id. § 1513(b)(1)
(referring to §§ 507 and 726); id. § 1517(d) (referring to § 350); id. § 1519(f) (referring to § 362(a), (b), and
(n)); id. § 1520(a)(1) (referring to §§ 361 and 362); id. § 1520(a)(2) (referring to §§ 363, 549, and 552); id.
§ 1520(a)(3) (referring to §§ 363 and 552); id. § 1520(a)(4) (referring to § 552); id. § 1521(a)(7) (referring to
§§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, and 724(a)); id. § 1521(f) (referring to § 362(a), (b), and (n)); id. § 1522(d)
(referring to § 322); id. § 1523(a) (referring to §§ 522, 544, 545, 547, 548, 550, 553, and 724(a)); id. § 1528
(referring to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1334(e)); id. § 1529(4) (referring to § 305); id. § 1531
(referring to § 303); see also id. § 304 (repealed 2005) (not referring to § 109(a) nor any other section, for that
matter).
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allows courts to hold that § 109(a) does not apply to chapter 15 because
Congress omitted any reference to the section and its requirements.97 In
addition, unique § 1508 instructs courts to consider the international origin of
chapter 15 “and the need to promote an application of [chapter 15] that is
consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign
jurisdictions.”98 That pronouncement encourages courts not to look outside of
chapter 15 for additional provisions that might be applicable to cross-border
proceedings.99
The United Nations wanted the Model Law to be adopted with very few
changes (if any at all) to achieve international legal harmony.100 If a court
applies a provision to chapter 15, then the court defeats § 1508’s objective of
consistency among nations adopting the Model Law.101
97 See ImagePoint, Inc. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 12 Civ. 7183 (LAK) (GWG), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 87695, at *40 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2014) (“Under that doctrine [of expressio unius], ‘when certain
matters are mentioned . . . , other similar matters not mentioned were intended to be excluded.’” (quoting
Plumbers & Steamfitters Local No. 150 Pension Fund v. Vertex Const. Co., 932 F.2d 1443, 1449 (11th Cir.
1991)) (citing In re Celotex Corp., 487 F.3d 1320, 1334 (11th Cir. 2007); Covington Square Assocs., LLC v.
Ingles Mkt., Inc., 641 S.E.2d 266 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007))); see also Rushton v. ANR Co. (In re C.W. Mining
Co.), 740 F.3d 548, 560 (10th Cir. 2014) (“Common sense, reflected in the canon expressio unius est exclusio
alterius, suggests that the specification of [one provision] implies the exclusion of others.” (quoting Elwell v.
Okla. ex. rel. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 693 F.3d 1303, 1312 (10th Cir. 2012))); Tacon v.
Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 324 & n.22 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Generally where
there are enumerated exceptions ‘additional exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of a contrary
legislative intent.’ And the oft recited maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius carries weight.” (quoting
Andrus v. Glover Const. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 616–17 (1980)) (citing Tex. Oil & Gas Ass’n v. EPA, 161 F.3d
923, 938–39 (5th Cir. 1998))); Neidich v. Lorenzo (In re Lorenzo), No. 13-23100-CIV-ROSENBAUM, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 64321, at *10–11 (S.D. Fla. May 8, 2014) (citing TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 28
(2001) (“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions to a general prohibition, additional
exceptions are not to be implied, in the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.”); In re Sunahara,
326 B.R. 768, 781 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (using expressio unius est exclusio alterius to state that § 1329(b)
applies some “Code sections to plan modifications but does not apply § 1325(b)”); In re Davis, 439 B.R. 863,
867 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2010)).
98 11 U.S.C. § 1508; see also British Am. Ins. Co. v. Fullerton (In re British Am. Ins. Co.), 488 B.R. 205,
212 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2013) (“International uniformity is a primary goal of the Model Law and thus of chapter
15.” (citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 1501(a), 1508)); Lavie v. Ran, 406 B.R. 277, 281 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“Unique to the
interpretation of Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, ‘the court shall consider its international origin, and the
need to promote an application of [Chapter 15] that is consistent with the application of similar statutes
adopted by foreign jurisdictions.’” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006))), aff’d sub nom. Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran),
607 F.3d 1017 (5th Cir. 2010).
99 See 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2012).
100 See In re British Am. Ins. Co., 488 B.R. at 212 (“UNCITRAL expressed the desire that the Model Law
be enacted by adopting countries with as few changes as possible ‘in order to achieve a satisfactory degree of
harmonization and certainty.’” (citing GUIDE TO ENACTMENT OF THE UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON CROSSBORDER INSOLVENCY, supra note 25, at ¶ 12)).
101 See 11 U.S.C. § 1508.
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Second, Bemarmara addresses something that was overlooked
previously.102 Section 109(a) determines who may be a debtor under the Code,
but chapter 15 considers recognition of a foreign representative, not of a debtor
from a foreign proceeding.103 Once a foreign court concludes a debtor’s
insolvency proceeding, that court appoints a foreign representative to other
nations’ courts to ensure that the debtor’s applicable assets and affairs are
liquidated or reorganized according to the foreign proceeding.104 Section
109(a) does not control because it regulates a person who is not seeking
recognition in chapter 15.105
Chapter 15 provides examples of Congress distinguishing between debtors
and foreign representatives. In § 1502’s definitions, the term “debtor” is used
several times, but the definitions never state, claim, or even insinuate that a
debtor is also a foreign representative.106 Section 1524 handles intervention by
a foreign representative and distinguishes between the two terms by saying that
“the foreign representative may intervene in any proceedings . . . in which the
debtor is a party.”107 Section 1518(2) requires prompt filing of any status
change caused by any of a debtor’s foreign proceedings.108 Section 1521(b)
allows a court to grant asset-distribution powers to a foreign representative.109
Several more sections address debtors and foreign representatives, but in all of
the sections, chapter 15 treats them as separate individuals.110
102

See Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing, supra note 9, at 9 (discussing the applicability of § 109(a)).
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(a); Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing, supra note 9, at 9.
104 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(24).
105 See Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing, supra note 9, at 9. Even if § 109(a) did apply, in the context of
a business, courts have held that “[a] principal place of business is not required to satisfy Section 109(a)’s
requirement, rather it is merely ‘a’ place of business.” In re Zais Inv. Grade Ltd. VII, 455 B.R. 839, 844
(Bankr. D.N.J. 2011) (citing In re Paper I Partners, L.P., 283 B.R. 661, 672 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002)).
106 See 11 U.S.C. § 1502.
107 Id. § 1524.
108 See id. § 1518(2) (“From the time of filing the petition for recognition of a foreign proceeding, the
foreign representative shall file with the court promptly a notice of change of status concerning . . . any other
foreign proceeding regarding the debtor that becomes known to the foreign representative.”).
109 See id. § 1521(b) (“[T]he court may, at the request of the foreign representative, entrust the distribution
of all or part of the debtor’s assets located in the United States to the foreign representative or another
person.”).
110 See, e.g., id. § 1509(f) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, the failure of a foreign
representative to commence a case or to obtain recognition under this chapter does not affect any right the
foreign representative may have to sue in a court in the United States to collect or recover a claim which is the
property of the debtor.”); id. § 1512 (“Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign representative in
the recognized proceeding is entitled to participate as a party in interest in a case regarding the debtor under
this title.”); id. § 1515(c) (“A petition for recognition shall also be accompanied by a statement identifying all
foreign proceedings with respect to the debtor that are known to the foreign representative.”); id. § 1519(a)
(“From the time of filing a petition for recognition until the court rules on the petition, the court may, at the
103
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What if a foreign representative is also the debtor? Nothing in chapter 15
precludes that scenario.111 How does the application of § 109(a) change if the
debtor and the foreign representative are the same? Quite simply, the analysis
does not change. Section 109(a)’s perspective focuses on who may be a debtor
under the Code.112 Separately, chapter 15 focuses on whether recognition of a
foreign proceeding will be granted because of the foreign representative’s
petition.113 The debtor, regardless of whether he is also the foreign
representative, is a debtor in another jurisdiction already. The petition to the
United States is to recognize the foreign proceeding so that the debtor’s United
States assets can be managed according to the foreign proceeding.114 From a
statutory angle, that scenario should never matter because one section pertains
to a debtor, and the other section pertains to a foreign representative.115
This Comment emphasizes that courts should not apply § 109(a) to chapter
15 proceedings. Chapter 15 contains all necessary requirements for granting
recognition to a foreign proceeding, and Bemarmara illustrates that uses of
“debtor” and “foreign representative” are exclusive of one another in various
sections of the Code.116
B. Center of Main Interests Date Determination
Courts disagree about when to determine COMI under chapter 15. The
concept appears only three times in chapter 15.117 Despite appearing in the
request of the foreign representative, where relief is urgently needed to protect the assets of the debtor or the
interests of the creditors, grant relief of a provisional nature . . . .”); id. § 1519(a)(2) (“[E]ntrusting the
administration or realization of all or part of the debtor’s assets located in the United States to the foreign
representative or another person . . . .”); id. § 1520(a)(3) (“[T]he foreign representative may operate the
debtor’s business and may exercise the rights and powers of a trustee under and to the extent provided by
sections 363 and 552.”); id. § 1521(a) (“Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding, . . . where necessary to
effectuate the purpose of this chapter and to protect the assets of the debtor or the interests of the creditors, the
court may, at the request of the foreign representative, grant any appropriate relief . . . .”); id. § 1521(a)(5)
(“[E]ntrusting the administration or realization of all or part of the debtor’s assets within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States to the foreign representative or another person . . . .”); id. § 1523(a) (“Upon
recognition of a foreign proceeding, the foreign representative has standing in a case concerning the debtor
pending under another chapter of this title . . . .”).
111 See id. §§ 1501–1532.
112 See id. § 109(a).
113 See id. § 1517.
114 Or, vice versa, where a foreign proceeding seeks assistance with a case that arose under chapter 15,
another category where chapter 15 applies. See id. § 1501(b)(2).
115 See id. §§ 109(a), 1517.
116 See id. §§ 109(a), 1501–1532; Transcript of Bemarmara Hearing, supra note 9.
117 See 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (“‘[F]oreign main proceeding’ means a foreign proceeding pending in the
country where the debtor has the center of its main interests . . . .”); id. § 1516(c) (“[T]he debtor’s registered
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Code infrequently, COMI has generated discussion in many chapter 15 case
opinions, and the following sections analyze the two timing options and assert
the correct time to determine a debtor’s COMI in bankruptcy proceedings.
1. COMI Determined at Chapter 15 Petition Date
In Lavie v. Ran, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas
examined various COMI aspects and presumed that a business debtor’s
registered office or an individual debtor’s habitual residence is its COMI—
noting, however, that the presumption can be defeated by contrary evidence.118
The court turned to European courts that interpreted COMI in several cases as
an individual debtor’s habitual or permanent residence because chapter 15
(specifically § 1502) fails to define COMI.119 Then, the court addressed a
question of COMI timing as it relates to chapter 15.120
The district court felt required “to make an independent finding at the time
the petition for recognition [was] filed in the U.S. court,” instead of looking
back to the beginning of the foreign proceeding because the chapter 15 is
written in present tense.121 Additionally, courts analyze COMI when
recognition petitions are filed, and so, the analysis should focus on the present,

office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the center of the debtor’s main
interests.”); id. § 1517(b)(1) (“Such foreign proceeding shall be recognized—as a foreign main proceeding if it
is pending in the country where the debtor has the center of its main interests . . . .”).
118 See 406 B.R. 277, 283 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d sub nom. Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017 (5th
Cir. 2010) (“[T]he debtor’s registered office, or habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to
be the center of the debtor’s main interests.” (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2006)) (citing In re Tri-Continental
Exch., 349 B.R. 627, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006))).
119 See 11 U.S.C. § 1502; Lavie, 406 B.R. at 283 (citing Case C-452/93, Pedro Magdalena Fernández v.
Comm’n, 1994 E.C.R. 4295; Case 13/73, Anciens Établissements D. Angenieux fils aîné v. Hakenberg, 1973
E.C.R. 935). To European courts, habitual residence depends on whether the debtor intends to stay in the
location permanently, on the length of time spent in the location, and on the occupational or familial ties to the
area. See Lavie, 406 B.R. at 283 (citing Case 41/84, Pinna v. Caisse d’allocations familiales de la Savoie, 1986
E.C.R. 1). These factors are not determinative, however, if other evidence establishes clearly that the debtor’s
COMI is somewhere else. See id. (citing Case 284/87, Schäflein v. Comm’n, 1988 E.C.R. 4475).
120 See Lavie, 406 B.R. at 283–84.
121 Id. at 283–85 (citing In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 120 n.22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d, 371
B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (“The use of the present tense implies that the court’s . . . analysis should focus on
whether the debtor has [a presence] in the foreign country when the foreign representative files for recognition
under Chapter 15.”). Additionally, “[t]he Bear Stearns court agreed, noting that ‘[i]f the debtor does not have
its center of main interests or at least an establishment in the country of the foreign proceedings, the
bankruptcy court should not grant recognition . . . .’” Id. at 285 (citing In re Bear Stearns High-Grade
Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 389 B.R. 325, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2008); In re SPhinX, 351 B.R. at
120 n.22).
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not a lookback period.122 Therefore, Lavie instructs that COMI is determined
when a foreign representative files a chapter 15 petition for recognition.123
On appeal, the appellant argued for studying the appellee’s operational
history because the appellee was located in Israel before filing a petition for
chapter 15 recognition, but the Fifth Circuit disagreed.124 The court looked to
§ 1502, like the lower court had done, and when the court did not find a
timeframe associated with COMI, the court decided that § 1502’s verb tense
provided an answer.125 The court declared that Congress’s use of the present
and present progressive tenses “requires courts to view the COMI
determination . . . at the time the petition for recognition was filed.”126
The court believed that Congress would have created a lookback period for
chapter 15 if it had wanted to include one, especially because it had created
lookback periods in other parts of the Code.127 Therefore, a court fulfills
chapter 15’s purpose by studying COMI on the recognition petition date.128
Lastly, the court worried that if courts focus on lookback periods, then they
would come to different, conflicting results.129 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the
lower court’s ruling.130
In In re Betcorp Ltd., a bankruptcy court in Nevada pondered two options
for the correct time to determine COMI.131 A party in the case argued for

122

See id. at 285 (“Because courts undertake the . . . analysis when the foreign representative files for
recognition, it follows that the court should weigh only the evidence as it exists at the time of filing in the U.S.
court.”).
123 See id. at 283–84, 285.
124 In re Ran, 607 F.3d at 1025.
125 See id. (“[T]he grammatical tense in which [§ 1502] is written provides guidance.”).
126 Id.
127 See id. (“If Congress had, in fact, intended bankruptcy courts to view the COMI determination through
a lookback period or on a specific past date, it could have easily said so. This is particularly significant because
Congress is clearly capable of creating lookback periods in the Bankruptcy Code.” (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 522(b)(3)(A) (2006) (creating a lookback provision for property exemptions))). The Fifth Circuit’s argument
is flawed in two ways, discussed later in this Comment.
128 See id. (reiterating that “[c]hapter 15 was implemented by Congress in an attempt to harmonize
transnational insolvency proceedings,” but failing to state why examining a debtor’s COMI when a chapter 15
petition for recognition is filed satisfies chapter 15’s purpose).
129 See id. (“[T]here would be an increased likelihood of conflicting COMI determinations, as courts may
tend to attach greater importance to activities in their own countries, or may simply weigh the evidence
differently.”).
130 See id. at 1028.
131 See 400 B.R. 266, 286 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009) (“[S]hould COMI be determined as of the time of the
filing of the petition for recognition, or should the court look back and determine COMI in light of a debtor’s
operational history?”).
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looking at COMI beyond the chapter 15 petition date, but the court called that
argument flawed.132 The court speculated that adopting a lookback period
would disrupt the Model Law’s intent to create legal harmony133 and then
referenced an example of why courts cannot use a lookback period to
determine COMI.134 In that example, a court used a common sense argument
that looking back may create conflicting COMI determinations, and the
Betcorp court agreed.135
The bankruptcy court also looked to English cases that interpreted the
Regulation and found that they used a time close to the relevant proceeding.136
Additionally, those English cases found “that the identity of the country in
which an individual debtor’s debts were incurred was not a relevant
consideration in establishing where COMI might be.”137 Thus, the Betcorp
court addressed COMI on the chapter 15 petition date.138
During In re British American Isle of Venice (BVI), Ltd., the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Florida analyzed COMI by studying thirdparty perceptions of where a company could be located.139 Some courts had
equated COMI with principal place of business.140 Some even connected
COMI analysis “to the ‘nerve center’ analysis described” by the Supreme
Court.141 The court did not state explicitly when to determine COMI, but it
132

See id. at 290.
See id. (“[A lookback period] would frustrate the goals of using COMI to ‘harmonize’ insolvency
proceeding recognition transnationally, and it would make the determination of COMI imprecise and often
incorrect.”).
134 See id. at 290–91 (“[I]n his past, Mr. Ran had substantial interests in Israel, but on the date of the
petition for recognition, he had effectively no interests in that country.” (citing In re Ran, 390 B.R. 257, 260
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008))).
135 See id. at 291 (“[Giving] weight to the debtor’s interests over the course of its operational history may
destroy the uniformity and harmonization that is the goal of employing the COMI inquiry.” (citing In re Ran,
390 B.R. 257, 300 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2008))).
136 See id. at 292 (“[English cases] seem to select a time linked to the commencement or service of the
relevant insolvency proceeding.” (citing Shierson v. Vlieland-Boddy, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 974 [39], [55]
(Eng.); Re Collins & Aikman Corp. Grp., [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1754 [39] (Eng.))).
137 Id. (citing Shierson, [2005] EWCA (Civ) at [39]; Official Receiver v. Eichler, [2007] BPIR (Ch D.)
1636 (Eng.)).
138 See id.
139 See 441 B.R. 713 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010).
140 See id. at 720 (“Several courts have likened COMI to the ‘principal place of business’ concept under
United States law.” (citing In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884, 908–09 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); In re
Bear Stearns High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Master Fund, Ltd., 374 B.R. 122, 129 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2007), aff’d, 389 B.R. 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2008))).
141 Id. (equating a “nerve center” with a corporation’s headquarters (citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.
77, 95 (2010); In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 440 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010))).
133
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considered the locations of the debtor’s headquarters and its managers.142 The
court looked at the debtor’s assets on the chapter 15 petition date also.143
Importantly, the court observed third-party expectations and found that
those third parties considered the foreign representative’s location to be the
location of the debtor’s business, even the foreign representative remained in
one location for an extended period and then relocated the debtor’s business
activities.144 When third parties focus on the foreign representative’s location,
courts have acknowledged that COMI can shift.145 The court held that its case
did not involve an opportunistic shift or any biased distortion of COMI.146
Therefore, the debtor’s COMI could be where third parties considered the
foreign representative to be located, which was determined at the time of filing
for chapter 15 recognition in the United States.147
If the debtor’s COMI is unclear, a court, such as the In re British American
Insurance court, looks for alternate methods to determine COMI.148 There was
evidence in that case to rebut § 1516(c)’s presumption that COMI is the
debtor’s registered office or habitual residence, which caused the court to
expand its analysis.149
Petitioners asked the court to determine COMI on the chapter 15 petition
date; the opposing party asked the court to determine COMI when the
petitioners were appointed in foreign proceedings or through a lookback period
of the debtor’s operational history.150 To help choose an option, the court
consulted prior cases and gave particular attention to how they rejected using a
lookback period because of possible conflicts among decisions from country to
country that might undermine international uniformity.151 The court also found
support for its position in the text of chapter 15.152

142

See id. (“The court first considers the location of the Debtor’s headquarters and the location of those
who actually manage the Debtor.”).
143 See id. at 721.
144 See id. at 722–23 (citing In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. at 914; In re Fairfield Sentry, 440 B.R.
60).
145 See id. at 723 (citing In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. at 914; In re Fairfield Sentry, 440 B.R. 60).
146 See id. (citing In re Fairfield Sentry, 440 B.R. at 66).
147 See id. (citing In re Fairfield Sentry, 440 B.R. at 66).
148 See 425 B.R. at 909.
149 See id. at 908.
150 See id. at 909.
151 See id. at 909–10 (“[There was] concern for the possibility of conflicting COMI determinations in
various countries arising from different analyses of a debtor’s historical activities”).
152 See id. at 910 (“Chapter 15 itself provides guidance on the temporal focus of the COMI analysis.”).
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The court used the present verb tense in § 1517(b)(1) as proof of
Congressional intent to determine COMI on the chapter 15 petition date.153
Additionally, a foreign representative has to notify the court “of ‘any
substantial change’” to his appointment or to the foreign proceeding, which
causes a court to account for any change in the location of the debtor’s COMI
that may occur after a chapter 15 petition is filed but before recognition is
granted.154 Promoting international uniformity and consistency is a court’s
primary goal and can be achieved by “[s]electing the latest possible date for the
COMI analysis.”155
Outside of the United States, the Federal Court in Australia also studied its
national implementation of UNCITRAL’s Model Law and noted that it needed
to choose a date to determine COMI.156 The case’s main proceeding occurred
in the United States, and the foreign representative sought recognition in
Australia.157 Ultimately, the Federal Court decided similarly to how U.S. had
decided so far: COMI was determined at the time the court in Australia was
called upon to make a decision, not by looking back to the commencement of
the foreign proceeding.158
When the Second Circuit examined COMI in 2013, it declared that
identifying the relevant time meant considering the Code, federal court
holdings, and international sources.159 The Code, however, does not define
COMI.160 Instead, the court, like prior courts, focused on the use of present
tense throughout chapter 15’s COMI-related verbs.161
The Second Circuit drew authority from the Supreme Court, who said that
Congress’s choice of verb tense can determine “a statute’s temporal reach.”162
During another case in the Second Circuit, the court had been influenced by

153

See id. (“[Because a] chapter 15 case is commenced by the filing of a petition for recognition under
section 1504[, t]he present, for purposes of a court making a determination under section 1517(b)(1), can be no
earlier than the date that chapter 15 petition was filed.”).
154 Id.
155 Id.
156 See In re Australian Equity Investors [2012] FCA 1002 (5 Sept. 2012) (Austl.).
157 See id.
158 See id.
159 See Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 133 (2d Cir.
2013).
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 Id. at 133–34 (citing Carr v. United States, 560 U.S. 438 (2010); Dobrova v. Holder, 607 F.3d 297,
301 (2d Cir. 2010) (relying on Congress’s use of present perfect tense in statutory construction)).
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the Code’s verb tense.163 To the court, § 1517’s use of present and present
progressive tenses mattered to a relevant time frame analysis.164 In addition,
the court distinguished that the Code does not compel COMI determination at
the beginning of the foreign proceeding because that “proceeding ‘is pending’
only after it has been commenced.”165 As a result, the Code favors using the
chapter 15 petition date in COMI analysis.166
The Morning Mist court was influenced by other federal courts analyzing
COMI on the chapter 15 petition date.167 The Second Circuit looked at other
appellate courts first and found support in the Fifth Circuit Ran decision that
rejected a lookback period.168 Congress could put a lookback period in the
Code, but it did not put one in chapter 15.169 Furthermore, studying a range of
time could muddle a discernible COMI.170
When the Morning Mist court looked beyond appellate courts, it found that
most other courts used the chapter 15 petition date as well.171 One court had
looked to § 304 (chapter 15’s predecessor) for language supporting using “the

163 See id. at 134 (“[The court was] guided by the tense used in a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
allowing bankruptcy trustees to hire professionals . . . as long as the professionals ‘do not hold or represent an
interest adverse to the estate.’” (quoting Bank Brussels Lambert v. Coan (In re AroChem Corp.), 176 F.3d 610,
623 (2d Cir. 1999))).
164 See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) (2012)).
165 Id. (“COMI determination based on the date of the initiation of the foreign proceeding is not
compelled by the statute [because a] foreign proceeding ‘is pending’ only after it has been commenced.”
(emphasis added) (quoting 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1))).
166 See id. (“Under the text of the statute, therefore, the filing date of the Chapter 15 petition should serve
to anchor the COMI analysis.”).
167 See id. (“Nearly every federal court to address this [temporal] question has determined that COMI
should be considered as of the time the Chapter 15 petition is filed.”).
168 See id. (“Every operative verb is written in the present or present progressive tense. . . . Congress’s
choice to use the present tense requires courts to view the COMI determination in the present, i.e. at the time
the petition for recognition was filed. If Congress had, in fact, intended bankruptcy courts to view the COMI
determination through a look-back period or on a specific past date, it could have easily said so.” (emphasis
omitted) (citing Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 2010))).
169 See id. (referring to a lookback period in § 522(b)(3)(A) (citing In re Ran, 607 F.3d at 1025)).
170 See id. (“[L]ooking at a company’s full operational history could make it more difficult to pinpoint a
single COMI.”).
171 See id. at 135 (“[Courts] throughout the country appear to have examined a debtor’s COMI as of the
time of the Chapter 15 petition.” (citing In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., No. 10 Civ. 7311 (GBD), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 105770, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2011); In re British Am. Isle of Venice (BVI), Ltd., 441 B.R. 713,
720–21 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884, 909–10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); In
re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 290–92 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009))). But see In re Millennium Glob. Emerging
Credit Master Fund Ltd., 474 B.R. 88, 92 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“COMI should be determined as of the date of the
commencement of the foreign proceeding, rather than—as most of the courts that have looked at the issue have
concluded—the date on which the Chapter 15 petition was filed.”).
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time of the commencement of the foreign liquidation proceeding,” but the
court disregarded this approach because BAPCPA repealed § 304.172
Following § 1508’s directive to promote international unity, the Morning
Mist court studied how foreign jurisdictions analyze COMI.173 The Regulation
“employs the present tense,” as does chapter 15.174 Additionally, the
Regulation promotes regular and ascertainable interpretations of COMI.175 The
Second Circuit conveyed unease, however, that the link between COMI and a
“place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a
regular basis” might invoke a broader time period.176 Nevertheless, chapter 15
and the Regulation were not perfect analogs to the court because chapter 15
requires a recognition petition, whereas an EU proceeding applies in each
Member State.177 The court conceded that the Regulation may refer to a
broader COMI time period, but it rejected the Regulation’s influence when
interpreting chapter 15.178
English courts chose times around the proceeding’s commencement, but
the Second Circuit thought that the language relied upon was too ambiguous to
be influential.179 European courts look for a COMI that “is regular and
ascertainable.”180 Those courts have expressed concern about COMI
tampering, but a regular and ascertainable COMI is not moved easily.181
172

In re Fairfield Sentry, 714 F.3d at 136.
See id.
174 Id.
175 See id.
176 Id. (citing Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, at Preamble ¶ 13).
177 See id. (“[A] proceeding in one EU member state is automatically recognized by all other EU member
states.” (citing Council Regulation 1346/2000, supra note 20, at art. 16)). Furthermore,
173

In In re Millennium Global, the bankruptcy court observed that “[t]he EU Regulation does not
contemplate the commencement of a separate ancillary proceeding to seek recognition of a
foreign insolvency case, as in the Model Law and chapter 15, as the members of the Union are
automatically required to recognize foreign proceedings from the date of their opening.” But that
conclusion does not persuade us that we should determine COMI under Chapter 15 based on the
date of commencement of the foreign proceeding as the bankruptcy court held in that case;
rather, it suggests that the EU Regulation may be a poor analog for interpreting Chapter 15.
Id. at 136 n.9 (citing In re Millennium Glob. Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 74 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 474 B.R. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
178 See id. at 136 (“Although the EU Regulation might refer to a broader time frame for considering a
debtor’s COMI, [the Regulation] is not a fit for construing Chapter 15.”).
179 See id. at 134 n.8 (citing Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 2010)).
180 Id. at 136–37 (citing Case C-341/04, Eurofood IFSC Ltd., 2006 E.C.R. I-3813, ¶ 33; Stanford Int’l
Bank Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 137, [54–56] (Eng.)).
181 See id. at 137 (“A COMI that is regular and ascertainable is not easily subject to tactical removal.”
(citing Eurofood, 2006 E.C.R. at ¶ 35)).
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Overall, the Second Circuit believed that international sources were not very
useful and held that COMI should be analyzed on the chapter 15 petition date,
except when there is evidence of bad faith manipulation.182
In April 2014, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Delaware
emphasized the exception for possible COMI manipulation.183 The In re Irish
Bank Resolution Corp. court stated that the Code’s plain language directs
courts to study matters presently on the chapter 15 petition date, not
historically to prior proceedings.184 Citing the Second Circuit, the court
stressed chapter 15’s use of present tense.185 Evidence of possible COMI
manipulation, however, allows a court to observe the period starting from the
chapter 15 petition date and going back to the foreign proceeding’s beginning,
but no further.186
In 2015 and 2016, courts did not discuss the timing issue in as much depth.
In fact, the cases that mentioned it stated in one manner-of-fact sentence each
that the chapter 15 petition date is the date courts should use.187
2. COMI Determined Through Lookback Period
Despite decisions by other courts, the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York offered its own interpretation of when to determine
COMI, and the court has reaffirmed its position more than once.188
To start, determining COMI is a two-step process.189 First, the court
decides upon the appropriate date for COMI analysis, and second, the court
uses factors to locate the debtor’s COMI.190 Immediately, the court noted that
182 See id. (“[I]nternational sources are of limited use in resolving whether U.S. courts should determine
COMI at the time of the Chapter 15 petition or in some other way.”).
183 See In re Ir. Bank Resolution Corp. (In Special Liquidation), No. 13-12159 (CSS), 2014 Bankr. LEXIS
1990 (Bankr. D. Del. 2014).
184 See id. at *36 (“The plain language of the statute clearly indicates that the relevant time period to
consider is the date of filing of the Chapter 15 petition, not the debtor’s ‘entire operational history.’” (citing In
re Fairfield Sentry, 714 F.3d at 133)).
185 See id. (citing In re Fairfield Sentry, 714 F.3d at 134).
186 See id. (citing In re Fairfield Sentry, 714 F.3d at 133). Sometimes, COMI will be the same under either
scenario. See, e.g., id. at *36–37.
187 See In re Creative Fin. Ltd., 543 B.R. 498, 518–19 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016); In re OAS S.A., 533 B.R.
83, 100 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing In re Fairfield Sentry, 714 F.3d at 133).
188 See In re Kemsley, 489 B.R. 346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re Millennium Glob. Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 474 B.R. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
189 See In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 71.
190 See id.
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relevant cases identify COMI on the chapter 15 petition date.191 Those cases
rely on verb tense and belief that another date would endanger COMI
interpretations.192
Nevertheless, the court opted to conflict with other courts on grounds that
the plain meaning of the Code does not require using the chapter 15 petition
date and that using the chapter 15 petition date is actually inconsistent with the
Code.193 Even though prior cases emphasize the use of present tense, they do
not explain why present tense favors a chapter 15 date over the beginning of a
foreign proceeding.194 Chapter 15 proceedings are secondary to foreign
proceedings,195 and its legislative history illustrates that point.196 In fact, the
date when the foreign representative applies for recognition “is a matter of
happenstance.”197 For instance, in Millennium, three years separated the
chapter 15 petition and the liquidation proceeding in Bermuda.198 With such a
gap between proceedings, the court determined COMI at the beginning of the
foreign proceeding.199
The Millennium court also translated COMI into plain English and
demonstrated how the term can be clear.200 Generally, in the United States,
COMI is associated with principal place of business.201 A drafter of the Model
Law and of chapter 15 explained that

191

See id. (“[T]he few cases on point (both business and individual) have determined the COMI of an
entity . . . as of the date of the filing of the chapter 15 petition.” (citing Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d
1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 2010) (individual); In re Fairfield Sentry, Ltd., 440 B.R. 60 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010)
(business); In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884, 909–11 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) (business); In re Betcorp
Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 290–92 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009) (business))).
192 See id. (“[A]ny other date in the past would create a serious chance of conflict with the decisions of
other courts.” (citing In re Ran, 607 F.3d at 1025, 1026)).
193 See id. at 72.
194 See id. (“[T]he courts do not explain why they assume that the statute refers to the filing of the chapter
15 petition rather than the filing of the petition in the case for which recognition is sought.”).
195 See id. (“[T]he U.S. case is ancillary or secondary to the foreign proceeding.” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1504
(2006); In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 189 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011))).
196 Id. at 72 n.20 (“[T]here is a ‘United States policy in favor of a general rule that countries other than the
home country of the debtor, where a . . . proceeding would be brought, should usually act through ancillary
proceedings in aid of the . . . [foreign] proceedings. . . .” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, 107–08 (2005),
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88 (commentary relating to 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006)))).
197 Id. at 72.
198 See id.
199 See id. (“The substantive date for the determination of the COMI issue is at the date of the opening of
the foreign proceeding for which recognition is sought.”).
200 See id.
201 See id.
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Chapter 15 was drafted to follow the Model Law as closely as
possible, with the idea of encouraging other countries to do the same.
One example is use of the phrase “center of main interests,” which
could have been replaced by “principal place of business” as a phrase
more familiar to American judges and lawyers. The drafters of
Chapter 15 believed, however, that such a crucial jurisdictional test
should be uniform . . . .202

Courts have used COMI and principal place of business interchangeably.203 If
a court switches the terms, then it would locate a debtor’s business (or
residence for individuals) on a date before liquidation.204
Once a court orders liquidation, the business stops, and there is no more
principal place of business.205 Courts distinguish principal place of business in
reorganization cases by noting that the new place relates to “the reorganizing
entity, not the debtor.”206 The Millennium court recognized both that a
liquidating business no longer has a principal place and that reorganization
proceedings are rare outside of the United States—illustrating why
UNCITRAL would not have based the Model Law’s universal terms on
uncommon proceedings.207
The Millennium court also looked at the Code prior to BAPCPA and found
a requirement for courts “to consider the ‘principal place of business’ or
‘principal assets’ of a debtor when determining whether to recognize a foreign
proceeding.”208 Section 101(23) of the Code defined a foreign proceeding as
202 Id. (quoting Westbrook, Chapter, supra note 89, at 719–20); see also id. at 72 n.21 (citing Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1019, 1020 n.9 (2007)
(“COMI is similar to standards like ‘principal place of business,’ ‘chief executive office,’ or ‘real seat’ that one
finds in many statutes in the United States and elsewhere.”)); In re Tri-Continental Exch., 349 B.R. 627, 633
(Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) (quoting Westbrook, Chapter, supra note 89, at 719–20).
203 See In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 72 (citing In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 287–88 (Bankr. D. Nev.
2009); In re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008)).
204 See id. (“[T]he date for determining an entity’s place of business refers to the business of the entity
before it was placed into liquidation.”).
205 See id. (“A debtor does not continue to have a principal place of business after liquidation is ordered
and the business stops operating.”).
206 Id. at 73.
207 See id. at 73, 73 n.22 (“[T]he drafters of the Model Law would not have employed the term with a
reorganization case in mind because reorganization is rare in most countries outside the United States.” (citing
Terence C. Halliday, Legitimacy, Technology, and Leverage: The Building Blocks of Insolvency Architecture
in the Decade Past and the Decade Ahead, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1081, 1094 (2007); Christoph G. Paulus,
Global Insolvency Law and the Role of Multinational Institutions, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 755 n.18 (2006–
2007); U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY LAW, U.N.
Pub. Sales No. E.05.V.10 (2005))).
208 Id. at 73.
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one “in a foreign country in which the debtor’s . . . principal place of business
or principal assets were located at the commencement of the proceeding, but
which is convened for the purpose of liquidation or debt adjustment . . . or
reorganization.”209 That definition means that courts use a date from the
commencement of the foreign proceeding.210 The Model Law contains a
simpler definition, but there is no evidence that Congress meant to change
court practices.211
The Regulation does not account for separate ancillary proceedings because
they are unnecessary in the EU; Member States recognize foreign proceedings
automatically.212 The insolvency proceeding’s commencement date is what the
Regulation’s drafters had to consider for COMI.213 The Millennium court
acknowledged that some English cases use times around the commencement of
insolvency proceedings, but in subsequent cases, English courts have rejected
determining COMI at times after a business fails.214
Next, the court addressed an argument used in prior decisions: Establishing
a date before the chapter 15 filing “would be bad policy” for COMI
determination.215 Instead of creating a vague inquiry, using an insolvency
proceeding’s commencement date actually falls within the plain meaning of
the Code.216 The court demonstrated that whereas chapter 15 had been used in
the United States to deny recognition, a New Zealand court had used statutory
language to recognize an English proceeding.217

209

Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (1990) (amended by Pub. Law. No. 109-8 (2005))).
See id. (“[T]he determination as to ‘principal place of business’ [is] to be made as of ‘the
commencement of the proceeding,’ i.e., the foreign proceeding.”).
211 See id. at 73, 73 n.23 (“The Model Law simplified and shortened the definition . . . , but there is no
indication in chapter 15 or the legislative history that Congress intended to change the prior bankruptcy
practice of looking to the date when foreign proceedings were first commenced.” (citing Mark Lightner,
Determining the Center of Main Interests Under Chapter 15, 18 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 5 Art. 2, n.76 (2009)
(stating that there is no legislative history on the issue))).
212 See id. at 74; see also id. at 73 n.25 (citing Case C-444/07, MG Probud Gdynia, sp. z o.o., 2010 E.C.R.
I-417 (requiring recognition of a Polish insolvency proceeding in Germany)).
213 See id. at 74.
214 See id. at 74 n.26 (citing Stanford Int’l Bank Ltd., [2010] EWCA (Civ) 137, [54], [56(4)] (Eng.);
Shierson v. Vlieland-Boddy, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 974, [38], [55], [71] (Eng.); Lightner, supra note 211
(recognizing that the EU Regulation requires a COMI determination as of the date of the opening of
insolvency proceedings)).
215 Id. at 74–75 (citing Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 2010); In re Betcorp, 400
B.R. at 291–92).
216 See id. at 75.
217 See id. at 75 n.27 (citing Williams v Simpson HC Hamilton CIV 2010-419-1174, 12 Oct. 2010 (N.Z.)).
The Millennium court stated
210
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COMI determination should not be used to bar foreign representatives
because that would contradict chapter 15’s purpose: cooperation.218 In fact,
using a chapter 15 petition date could lead to forum shopping because it
recognizes a change of residence since the original proceeding began.219 The
safest, uniform, and most importantly, correct, date for COMI is the beginning
of a foreign insolvency proceeding.220
Slightly more than a year after Millennium, the Bankruptcy Court for the
Southern District of New York discussed when to determine COMI again.221
The court affirmed determining COMI at the beginning of a foreign
proceeding, noting that since Millennium, UNCITRAL had endorsed
determining COMI at the commencement of a foreign proceeding and was
working on an amendment to the Model Law’s enactment guide to incorporate
that date.222
In early 2013, the same bankruptcy court addressed proper COMI timing
for a third time.223 The court stressed that determining the appropriate date for
COMI was “not just a theoretical concern” because two available options
would yield different results.224 The court agreed with its own rulings to use a
date from the beginning of the foreign proceeding.225 An “opportunity for
cross-border cooperation first came into being” when a petition was filed to
commence proceedings in the United Kingdom.226 That date was certain and
easy to verify.227 The chapter 15 petition date, however, was not as fixed.228

Otherwise, the result might have been to prevent an English estate administrator from any relief
in New Zealand and possibly to allow the debtor, who had apparently moved from England to
New Zealand, to retain some or all of the millions of dollars in gold that was found buried in his
basement.
Id. (citing Williams CIV 2010-419-1174).
218 See id. at 75 n.28 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(1) (2006); In re Atlas Shipping A/S, 404 B.R. 726, 738
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
219 See id. at 75.
220 See id. at 76.
221 See In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012).
222 See id. at 92 (citing Rep. on Working Group V’s 41st Sess., supra note 28, at ¶ 60 (stating that a
proposed change to the Model Law to clarify that the COMI determination be made as of the date of the
commencement of the foreign insolvency proceeding “received wide support”)). The Gerova court held that
even if it analyzed COMI on the chapter 15 petition date, its conclusion would be the same. See id. at 93.
223 See In re Kemsley, 489 B.R. 346 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
224 Id. at 353.
225 See id. at 354.
226 Id.
227 See id.
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With that understanding, a court determines COMI on a specific date, not a
potential date.229
Additionally, the Kemsley court studied COMI decisions in other
jurisdictions, especially the Fifth Circuit’s Ran decision.230 The court harped
that Ran’s focus on the present tense “places too much emphasis on an
otherwise neutral verb tense.”231 Section 1502(4) does not specify a date to
analyze COMI and can be interpreted legitimately as the commencement date
of a foreign proceeding.232 Furthermore, the court declared that the Fifth
Circuit’s analysis may support studying COMI once a chapter 15 petition is
filed, but that same analysis does not instruct what time to use.233 The Kemsley
court attached the debtor’s COMI to the start of the foreign insolvency
proceeding.234
During 2014, the Federal Court in Australia examined to its prior analysis
of COMI timing and changed its opinion.235 Like in its 2012 case, the court
had a debtor with a main proceeding in the United States and a foreign
representative who was seeking recognition in Australia. The court considered
three dates on which to determine COMI: the date of application for
recognition in Australia, the foreign proceeding’s commencement date, and the
date the court considered the application for recognition.236 Of those choices,
the court decided to use the foreign proceeding commencement date.237 The
court believed that the foreign commencement date was advantageous and that
the other options would lead to various outcomes in different nations, which
would not meet the goals of cooperation and promoting greater legal certainty
in cross-border insolvency law.238

228 See id. (“[The chapter 15 date] can vary greatly depending on circumstances and the diligence of the
foreign representative.”).
229 See id. at 356 (“Life is fluid, but COMI is a concept that is determined as of a fixed date . . . based on
the circumstances that then existed.”).
230 See id. at 359 (citing Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 2010)).
231 Id. (citing In re Ran, 607 F.3d at 1025).
232 See id.
233 See id.
234 See id. at 359, 360.
235 See In re Edelsten Kapila [2014] FCA 1112 (10 Oct. 2014) (Austl.).
236 See id.
237 See id.
238 See id.

DELAUGHTER GALLEYSPROOFS

426

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/11/2016 11:23 AM

[Vol. 32

3. Why This Comment Suggests Determining COMI Through a Lookback
Period
This Comment cites four reasons to use a lookback period when deciding
whether to analyze COMI on the chapter 15 petition date or the foreign
proceeding date.
First, applying textualism to chapter 15 reveals that the proper date to
determine COMI is the foreign proceeding date. As Millennium demonstrates,
chapter 15’s plain meaning does not require using the chapter 15 petition
date.239 Courts begin with the plain statutory meaning because a “common
theme in the Supreme Court’s bankruptcy jurisprudence . . . is that courts must
apply the plain meaning of the Code unless its literal application would
produce a result demonstrably at odds with” Congressional intent.240 Section
239

See 458 B.R. 63, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff’d, 474 B.R. 88 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
Chase Manhattan Mortg. Corp. v. Shapiro (In re Lee), 530 F.3d 458, 470 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing
Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6 (2000) (“[W]hen the statute’s
language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required by the text is not
absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”); Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992)
(“[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to one, cardinal canon before all others. We have
stated time and again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a
statute what it says there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
judicial inquiry is complete.”); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235 (1989) (“[W]here, as here, the
statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.”)). The plain
meaning analysis has been applied by the Supreme Court in at least eleven additional cases since 1991. See In
re Lee, 530 F.3d at 470 n.10 (citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 549 U.S. 443
(2007); Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465, 486 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); Lamie v. United States
Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004); FCC v. NextWave Pers. Commc’ns Inc., 537 U.S. 293, 304 (2003); Rake v.
Wade, 508 U.S. 464, 473 (1993); Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753, 757–58 (1992); Taylor v. Freeland &
Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 642–43 (1992); Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 158 (1991); Toibb v. Radloff, 501
U.S. 157, 160 (1991)); see also Ransom v. FIA Card Servs., N.A., 562 U.S. 61, 69 (2011) (looking to
dictionary definitions to obtain a statute’s ordinary meaning (citing Hamilton v. Lanning, 560 U.S. 505
(2010))); Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. United States, 559 U.S. 229, 252 (2010) (declining to view a
statute in a way contrary to its plain meaning). The plain meaning theme has been reiterated by courts
numerous times. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 768 F.3d 580, 587 (6th Cir. 2014) (explaining that
a court looks to the statute’s plain language first (citing Nat’l Air Traffic Controllers Ass’n v. Sec’y of the
DOT, 654 F.3d 654, 657 (6th Cir. 2011); Menuskin v. Williams, 145 F.3d 755, 768 (6th Cir. 1998)));
Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Barnet (In re Barnet), 737 F.3d 238, 250 (2d Cir. 2013) (“A
properly limited contextual analysis of statutory language is encompassed within the ambit of a textual
analysis.” (citing In re Application of N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577
F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2009) (“[W]e examine the text of the statute itself, interpreting provisions in light of
their ordinary meaning and their contextual setting.”); United States v. Magassouba, 544 F.3d 387, 404 (2d
Cir. 2008) (“In determining whether statutory language is ambiguous, we ‘reference the language itself, the
specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole.’”)));
Kulakowski v. Walton (In re Kulakowski), 735 F.3d 1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 2013) (“In analyzing the
Bankruptcy Code, we begin with the text of the relevant provision . . . and confine our analysis to the plain
language of the statute.” (citing United States v. Zuniga-Arteaga, 681 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 2012)));
240
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1502(4) discusses a “proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has”
a COMI, and there is no reason to assume that the present verb tense refers to
the chapter 15 petition date instead of the date of the foreign proceeding.241
Courts may interpret § 1502(4) to mean the date of the foreign proceeding
because the section is silent about when to determine COMI.242
COMI should not be used as a bar against recognition, which is a distinct
possibility when courts use the chapter 15 petition date.243 Plus, using the
chapter 15 date is inconsistent with a textual reading of the Code because that
date contradicts the chapter’s purpose (and the Model Law’s purpose for that
matter).244 Chapter 15’s purpose, stated in § 1501 and by various courts, is to
promote cooperation between United States courts and foreign courts relating
to cross-border insolvency cases.245 Therefore, courts should regard the chapter

Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 136 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[T]he
statutory text controls, first and ultimately . . . .”); Ad Hoc Grp. of Vitro Noteholders v. Vitro SAB De CV (In
re Vitro SAB De CV), 701 F.3d 1031, 1047 (5th Cir. 2012) (“[Courts] interpret statutes according to their
plain meaning.” (citing Gaddis v. United States, 381 F.3d 444, 472 (5th Cir. 2004))); In re Ran, 607 F.3d at
1025 (“In the bankruptcy context, the analysis must end with the text if the language is clear and does not lead
to an absurd result.” (citing Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. at 238)); Lavie v. Ran, 406 B.R. 277, 281 (S.D. Tex.
2009) (“[T]he ‘plain meaning’ of words should be utilized when interpreting an ambiguous statute or when
terms are not otherwise defined.” (citing Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 715 (1989); Bankamerica Corp.
v. United States, 462 U.S. 122, 122–23 (1983))), aff’d sub nom. In re Ran, 607 F.3d 1017; In re Octaviar
Admin. Pty Ltd., 511 B.R. 361, 373 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“[T]he Court must abide by the plain meaning of
the words in the statute.” (citing In re Barnet, 737 F.3d 238)).
241 11 U.S.C. § 1502(4) (2012); see also In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 72 (“[T]he courts do not explain
why they assume that the statute refers to the filing of the chapter 15 petition rather than the filing of the
petition in the case for which recognition is sought”).
242 See In re Kemsley, 489 B.R. at 359 (“The section is silent regarding the ‘as of’ date for analyzing
COMI and can be properly read to mean the country where a debtor has his, her or its COMI as of the date of
opening of the foreign proceeding. The textual analysis adopted by the Fifth Circuit suggests that the language
supports testing for COMI when the chapter 15 petition is filed but does not provide meaningful temporal
guidance for using that date.”).
243 See In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 83 (“The COMI requirement should not be applied in [such] a
manner that would effectively establish a presumption against recognition of cases . . . .”).
244 See id. at 72.
245 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501; see also In re Barnet, 737 F.3d at 250–51 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)); In re
Ran, 607 F.3d at 1020–21 (“The statutory intent to conform American law with international law is explicit in
the text of Section 1501(a), and is also expressed in Section 1508, which states that ‘[i]n interpreting this
chapter, the court shall consider its international origin, and the need to promote an application of similar
statutes adopted by foreign jurisdictions.’” (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006); H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at
105 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 169 (“[Chapter 15] incorporates the Model Law on CrossBorder Insolvency to encourage cooperation between the United States and foreign countries with respect to
transnational insolvency cases . . . .”); 8 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 1501.01 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J.
Sommer eds., 15th ed. rev. 2008) (explaining the basis for Chapter 15))); Tacon v. Petroquest Res. Inc. (In re
Condor Ins. Ltd.), 601 F.3d 319, 322 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The Model Law was ‘expressly designed to be
integrated into local insolvency law’ and Chapter 15 closely hewed to the text of the enactment. ‘Any
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15 petition date as “a matter of happenstance” because a chapter 15 case in the
United States is secondary to a foreign proceeding.246
Second, when a court translates the debatably ambiguous COMI, it
uncovers connections to a principal place of business.247 Courts have held that
“‘[a] statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation or more than one accepted meaning,’” which applies to COMI
because courts have determined two different dates on which to apply the
concept.248 Section 1516(c) creates a presumption that a debtor’s principal
place of business is its COMI.249 Determining COMI as of the foreign
proceeding, therefore, is more favorable than determining it at the chapter 15
petition date because there is no principal place of business once a foreign
court has ordered liquidation.250
Under § 101(23) before BAPCPA, a foreign proceeding existed in a
country where the debtor had a principal place of business at the beginning of
the insolvency proceeding.251 Supreme Court precedent states that when
Congress amends the Code, the Court does not depart from major
departures from the actual text of the Model Law . . . were as narrow and limited as possible.’ All this being
part of an effort by the United States to harmonize international bankruptcy proceedings for the benefit of
American businesses operating abroad. As directed by Congress, we mind this background as we discern the
Chapter’s reach.” (citing LIEF M. CLARK, ANCILLARY AND OTHER CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY CASES UNDER
CHAPTER 15 OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE: A COLLIER MONOGRAPH § 2[4] (2008); Westbrook, Chapter, supra
note 89, at 720)); Lavie, 406 B.R. at 281 (“It is axiomatic that statutes should not be construed in a way that
defeats the statutory intent.” (citing United States v. Braverman, 373 U.S. 405, 408 (1963))); In re Betcorp
Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 276 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009) (“The statutory intent to meld American law into international
law is explicit . . . .” (citations omitted)).
246 In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 72 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1504 (2006); In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 189
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011)); see also id. at 72 n.20 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at pt. 1, 107–08 (“[In] the
chapter 15 legislative history, . . . there is a ‘United States policy in favor of a general rule that countries other
than the home country of the debtor, where a . . . proceeding would be brought, should usually act through
ancillary proceedings in aid of the . . . [foreign] proceedings . . . .’”)).
247 See id. at 72.
248 In re Condor, 601 F.3d at 321 n.7 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Valle, 538 F.3d 341, 345
(5th Cir. 2008)).
249 See In re Tri-Continental Exch., 349 B.R. 627, 634 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006) (“The statutory
presumption created by § 1516(c), on close examination, confirms that an entity’s ‘principal place of business’
in United States jurisprudence is that entity’s ‘center of main interests’ for purposes of § 1502(4).”). Other
courts have equated COMI and principal place of business as well. See In re Betcorp, 400 B.R. at 287–88; In
re Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master), 381 B.R. 37, 48 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008).
250 See In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 72 (“A debtor does not continue to have a principal place of business
after liquidation is ordered and the business stops operating.”).
251 See id. at 73 (“[A foreign proceeding is] a proceeding . . . in a foreign country in which the debtor’s . . .
principal place of business or principal assets were located at the commencement of the proceeding . . . .”
(quoting 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (1990), amended by Pub. L. No. 109-8 (2005))).
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interpretations of the Code, unless Congress indicates clearly that such a
departure is intended.252 Neither chapter 15 nor its legislative history, however,
contains an indication that Congress wanted to change bankruptcy practices
that affect COMI.253 Furthermore, UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency
Law) has proposed an amendment to the Model Law that adopts Millennium’s
determination that COMI should be analyzed through a lookback period.254
Third, determining COMI on the chapter 15 date allows a foreign
representative to shop forums.255 The foreign proceeding commencement date
is certain and verifiable.256 The chapter 15 petition date, however, is not fixed
and may vary among cases.257 One of the reasons the date can fluctuate is
because it recognizes “a change of residence between the date of opening
proceedings in the foreign nation and the chapter 15 petition date.”258 When
the Millennium court addressed the forum shopping issue, it noted that three
years had passed since the foreign proceeding before a chapter 15 petition for
recognition was filed in the United States.259 Courts should determine COMI
by looking back to the commencement date of the foreign proceeding to avoid
a potential forum shopping strategy that would subvert the purpose of chapter
15.260

252 See id. at 83 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992) (“When Congress amends the
bankruptcy laws, it does not write ‘on a clean slate’ . . . . This Court has been reluctant to accept arguments
that would interpret the Code . . . to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of at least
some discussion in the legislative history.”); Pa. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 562 (1990)
(“We will not read the Bankruptcy Code to erode past bankruptcy practice absent a clear indication that
Congress intended such a departure.”)).
253 Id. at 73 n.23 (“[T]here is no indication in chapter 15 or the legislative history that Congress intended
to change the prior bankruptcy practice of looking to the date on which foreign proceedings were first
commenced.” (citing Lightner, supra note 211 (stating that there is no legislative history on the issue))).
254 See In re Gerova Fin. Grp., Ltd., 482 B.R. 86, 92 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (citing Rep. on Working
Group V’s 41st Sess., supra note 28, at ¶ 60 (stating that a proposed change to the Model Law to clarify that
the COMI determination be made as of the date of the commencement of the foreign insolvency proceeding
“received wide support”)); see also id. at 92 n.10 (citing U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V
(Insolvency Law), Interpretation and Application of Selected Concepts of the UNICITRAL Model Law on
Cross-Border Insolvency Relating to Centre of Main Interests (COMI), 42d Sess., Nov. 26–30, 2012, ¶ 128C,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.107 (Sept. 13, 2012) (stating that use of the commencement date of the foreign
proceeding is consistent with the evidence required to apply for recognition and the “relevance accorded the
decision commencing the foreign proceeding and appointing the foreign representative”)).
255 See In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 75.
256 See In re Kemsley, 489 B.R. 346, 354 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013).
257 See id.
258 In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 75.
259 See id. at 72.
260 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012).

DELAUGHTER GALLEYSPROOFS

430

5/11/2016 11:23 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 32

Fourth, § 1508 of the Code directs courts to consider chapter 15’s
international origin and a need for cross-border uniformity.261 The only date
that courts throughout the EU may consider is the commencement date in a
foreign proceeding.262 That date is the only one they can consider because the
Regulation, binding on all Member States, “does not contemplate the
commencement of a separate ancillary proceeding to seek recognition of a
foreign insolvency case, as in the Model Law and chapter 15.”263 Instead, EU
Member States recognize each other’s proceedings automatically.264 If United
States courts intend to follow § 1508’s instruction to consult chapter 15’s
international foundation, then they should hold that the correct time to
determine COMI is on the foreign proceeding’s commencement date.
CONCLUSION
Chapter 15 has been a great addition to the Code, providing opportunities
for many distressed foreign debtors. With time, though, two strands of
decisions among courts have made relief more difficult to obtain for foreign
representatives and debtors. Requiring courts to apply § 109(a) to chapter 15 is
not only incorrect, but it is also alarming because it provides courts with an
easy way to bar recognition of foreign proceedings instead of promoting
international cross-border insolvency cooperation called for in § 1501(a).265
Second, determining COMI at the chapter 15 petition date is both
inaccurate and deceptive. A straightforward reading of chapter 15 uncovers
enough ambiguity that courts could decide to determine COMI at either the
chapter 15 petition date or through a lookback period, but since chapter 15
became part of the Code, international sources have indicated clearly (through
cases and a proposed Model Law amendment) that the start of the foreign
proceeding is when to determine COMI. Using a chapter 15 petition date
creates a possibility for foreign representatives and debtors to swindle the
American legal system by establishing a genuine COMI in the United States
261

See id. § 1508.
See In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 74 (“The date of the opening of initial insolvency proceeding is the
only date that the original drafters of the term [COMI] for the EU Regulation could have contemplated.”); see
also Lavie v. Ran (In re Ran), 607 F.3d 1017, 1026 (5th Cir. 2010) (“This is consistent with English cases
interpreting the European Union Regulation, which seem to select a time linked to the commencement or
service of the relevant insolvency proceeding.” (citing Shierson v. Vlieland-Boddy, [2005] EWCA (Civ) 974,
[39], [55] (Eng.); Re Collins & Aikman Corp. Grp., [2005] EWHC (Ch) 1754, [39] (Eng.))).
263 In re Millennium, 458 B.R. at 74.
264 See id.
265 See 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a).
262
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after a foreign proceeding has concluded. Analyzing COMI through a lookback
period avoids such an illusory shift in a party’s COMI.
Ultimately, chapter 15 is valuable to foreign representatives and debtors
and will continue to grow.266 Before it grows too much, though, courts should
halt current trends and declare that § 109(a) has no applicability to chapter 15
and that COMI is determined through a lookback period to the foreign
proceeding’s commencement date.
HARDY DELAUGHTER∗

266 See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Working Group V (Insolvency Law), Cross-Border
Recognition and Enforcement of Insolvency-Related Judgements, 48th Sess., Dec. 14–18, 2015, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.135 (Oct. 2, 2015) (discussing language for a new model law regarding recognizing and
enforcing foreign insolvency judgments); Parliament & Council Regulation 2015/848 of 20 May 2015 on
Insolvency Proceedings (Recast), 2015 O.J. (L 141) 19 (EU) (implementing years of insolvency amendments
and applying to courts on June 26, 2017).
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